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A (MODEST) SEPARATION OF POWERS
SUCCESS STORY
Tara Leigh Grove *
The United States Constitution was, in many respects, designed
to be "a machine that would go of itself."' The Constitution would be
made "politically self-enforcing by aligning the political interests of
officials ... with constitutional rights and rules."2 The system of sepa-
rated powers was a central component of this self-enforcing
"machine."3 As James Madison famously stated, "the great security ...
consists in giving to those who administer each department the neces-
sary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroach-
ments" on constitutional principles.4
Recent scholarship has, however, cast doubt on the effectiveness
of this constitutional design. First, scholars have argued that partisan
politics has eclipsed the checks and balances created by the Constitu-
tion, so that the relevant "check" now depends on the "separation of
parties, not powers."5  Second, and more broadly, scholars have
@ 2012 Tara Leigh Grove. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, William and Mary Law School. Many thanks, for helpful
comments and suggestions, to Neal Devins, David Landau, Daryl Levison, John
Manning, and Mark Seidenfeld. This Essay was also presented at a workshop on
"Second-Best Constitutionalism" at the University of Wisconsin Law School (Nov.
2011). I am grateful for the suggestions made at that workshop.
I MicHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WouLD Go OF ITSELF 18 (1986) (footnote
omitted).
2 Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitu-
tional Law, Public Law, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1791, 1832 (2009).
3 See Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin's Originalism,
103 Nw. U. L. REv. 663, 678 (2009) ("The Madisonian system of checks and balances
is, as Michael Kammen has described it, 'a machine that would go of itself.'" (quoting
KAMMEN, supra note 1, at 16-19)).
4 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
5 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARv. L. REv. 2312, 2385 (2006); infra Part I.
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doubted that the constitutional design will lead politicians to protect
constitutional values under any circumstances, because "there is no
robust mechanism . .. that could even in principle align" the interests
of elected officials with the public interest in constitutional
enforcement.6
In this Essay (drawing upon prior work),' I argue that there is an
important context in which the constitutional scheme of separated
powers has functioned quite well: safeguarding the Article III federal
judiciary. Efforts to strip federal jurisdiction have repeatedly been
blocked by the "checks" established by our constitutional structure.
Notably, the separation of powers has worked in this context not
despite the political incentives and ambitions of elected officials, but
because of those incentives and ambitions. Political actors have repeat-
edly found it in their interest to protect the authority of the indepen-
dent federal judiciary.
This separation of powers "success story" may have broader impli-
cations. To the extent that the judiciary serves as a guardian of indi-
vidual rights and other constitutional values, the structural safeguards
for the federal judiciary may indirectly protect those constitutional
concerns. Thus, by ensuring the authority of the Article III courts,
politicians may also-however inadvertently-safeguard other consti-
tutional principles. In sum, the Madisonian "machine" may work rea-
sonably well, after all.
I. CRITIQUES OF MADISON'S VISION
The system of separation of powers was designed to channel-
and thereby curtail-the influence of "factions."8 Madison expressed
particular concern about majority factions, which might gain substan-
tial political power in government and use that power to oppress
minorities.9 But he argued that such an oppressive faction was
6 Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term--Foreword: System Effects and the
Constitution, 123 HARv. L. REV. 4, 27 (2009); see infra Part I.
7 The discussion below draws upon two prior articles. See Tara Leigh Grove, The
Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 2507 (2012) [hereinafter
Grove, Article l Safeguards]; Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards ofFederalJuris-
diction, 124 HARv. L. REV. 869 (2011) [hereinafter Grove, Structural Safeguards].
8 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 4, at 323-25.
9 See id. at 323 ("It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against
the injustice of the other part.... If a majority be united by a common interest, the
rights of the minority will be insecure.").
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unlikely to gain power in the federal government.10 The government
would be divided into three departments (the executive, legislative,
and judicial), and the legislature would be further divided into the
House and Senate. Much of Madison's discussion focused on the
political institutions-i.e., the House, Senate, and Presidency.'
Madison reasoned that, even if a dangerous faction captured one of
these political institutions, the other institutions would use their con-
stitutional authority to prevent encroachments on constitutional prin-
ciples.12 Thus, he stated:
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. . .. Ambi-
tion must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.13
Accordingly, Madison did not trust that political actors would
protect constitutional principles for their own sake. "If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
10 That was in part because, in a large republic like the United States, there
would be a number of factions, which would compete with one another for power.
See id. at 324-25 (asserting that the society would "be broken into so many . . . classes
of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger
from interested combinations of the majority"). But Madison also emphasized that
the size of the country was not enough to control factions. See THE FEDERALIST No.
63, at 385 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the "advan-
tage [s]" of a large republic should not "supersed[e] the use of auxiliary precautions,"
such as the division of power between the House and Senate).
11 See Larry D. Kramer, "The Interest of the Man": James Madison, Popular Constitu-
tionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 697, 735 (2006)
(" [C]ourts were not a significant player in Madison's thinking .... Madison's original
theory of constitutional enforcement was political in nature, and the 'departments'
Madison had in mind when he wrote about separation of powers were the House, the
Senate, and the Executive . . . .").
12 Madison made this point most clearly in his discussion of bicameralism. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 378-79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It
doubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies
... where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 10, at 384, 387-90 (arguing that, if a dangerous faction
gained control over the House of Representatives, the Senate would serve as "a
defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions" and, con-
versely, in the unlikely event that the Senate were "transform[ed] . . . into a tyrannical
aristocracy .. . the House of Representatives, with the people on their side, will at all
times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles").
13 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 4, at 321-22.
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would be necessary."14 Instead, he assumed that many politicians
would be more concerned with enhancing their own power (or, at a
minimum, getting reelected). Madison's solution was to "harness"
these competing political incentives and ambitions-by arranging the
government so that all these "ambitious" political actors would check
one another.15
The Madisonian design has, however, recently come under attack
by scholars.16 First, in an influential article,' 7 Daryl Levinson and
Richard Pildes argue that this scheme is unlikely to work during peri-
ods of unified government.' 8 Instead, when the Presidency and Con-
gress are controlled by the same political party, the two branches are
likely to cooperate rather than compete.' 9 Accordingly, the relevant
"check" arises from the "separation of parties, not powers."20
14 Id. at 322; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to
adjust these clashing [factional] interests and render them all subservient to the pub-
lic good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.").
15 See Kramer, supra note 11, at 726-27 (asserting that "Madison understood per-
fectly well that the 'personal motives' and 'interests' of elected officials would be politi-
cal motives and political interests-in other words, ... responses to the desires and
beliefs of their constituents. The key to making the Constitution work lay in finding a
way to harness these political interests ... by using constitutional authority granted to
the institutions in which the officials worked, for the benefit of constitutional
enforcement.").
16 Notably, this Essay focuses on critiques of the Madisonian design itself, not
analyses of the Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence. For a recent
and powerful critique of the Court's decisions in this area, see John F. Manning, Sepa-
ration of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARv. L. REV. 1939, 1944 (2011) (arguing
that "the Constitution adopts no freestanding principle of separation of powers" that should
be judicially enforced).
17 See infra note 20 (noting the scholarly acceptance of the "separation of parties"
concept).
18 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 5, at 2316 (arguing that "[t]he greatest threat to
constitutional law's conventional understanding of, and normative goals for, separa-
tion of powers comes when government is unified").
19 Id. at 2329 ("When government is divided, party lines track branch lines, and
we should expect to see party competition channeled through the branches. The
resulting interbranch political competition will look, for better or worse, something
like the Madisonian dynamic of rivalrous branches. On the other hand, when govern-
ment is unified . .. we should expect interbranch competition to dissipate.").
20 This "separation of parties" concept has gained widespread acceptance among
scholars. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARv. L. REV. 1737,
1809-10 n.222 (2007) (agreeing that "the branches operate very differently depend-
ing on whether they are all controlled by the same party"); Neal Devins & David E.
Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design,
88 B.U. L. REv. 459, 479 (2008) (" [T]he separation of powers between Congress and
the White House has given way to the 'separation of parties.' Lawmakers advance
1650 [VOL. 87:4
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Second, and perhaps even more fundamentally, Adrian
Vermeule has urged that Madison's analysis is simply incomplete.
"The argument lacks any mechanism to ensure that competition
among institutions promoting their interests or ambitions will pro-
mote a state of affairs that is ... desirable overall."21 In other words,
Madison never explained why government officials would use their
institutional authority to protect, rather than to harm (or be neutral
toward), constitutional values.22
These powerful critiques do not necessarily undermine the
Madisonian separation of powers regime. But they do call for a more
refined analysis. The scheme of separated powers cannot merely be
presumed to promote constitutional values. Instead, the "success" of
that scheme must be demonstrated in particular contexts.23 In this
Essay, I aim to show that this structural design has worked well to safe-
guard one important constitutional value: the power of the indepen-
dent federal judiciary.
II. THE STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
In order to ascertain whether the separation of powers has
"worked" in a given area, it is necessary to identify a normative base-
line. 2 4 I rely on the scholarly debate surrounding jurisdiction-strip-
ping measures for the relevant baseline. There appears to be a
substantial amount of agreement on certain principles. 25 First, schol-
party interests, not Congress's institutional interests, such that relations between Con-
gress and the White House are defined by whether there is unified or divided govern-
ment." (footnote omitted)); Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration and Civil Rights:
Lessons Learned, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 77, 87 (2009) (agreeing that "[i]n
practice . . . competition between political parties often displaces competition
between the political branches"). Other scholars have, however, asserted that the
"separation of parties" argument may be somewhat overstated. See Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1036 (2008) (argu-
ing that "the American constitutional system ... displays both separation of powers
and parties in a complicated interaction").
21 Vermeule, supra note 6, at 27.
22 See id. at 27-28.
23 See Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 VA. L.
REv. 1417, 1429, 1447 (2010) (stating that the question whether "invisible-handjustifi-
cations actually work . .. is at least partly empirical" and that, as to Madisonian theory
in particular, it "requires an elaborate analysis of particular cases").
24 Indeed, as Professor Vermeule has observed, one of the difficulties of empiri-
cally "measuring" the success of various "invisible hand" arguments is that there is no
agreed-upon normative baseline. See id. at 1448.
25 Notably, I describe these normative standards in very inclusive terms-in order
to accommodate the variations in scholarly emphasis. But, for present purposes,
these standards should be sufficient. The scheme of separated powers has largely
2012] 1651
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ars generally agree that all jurisdiction-stripping proposals (defined
here as efforts to restrict or eliminate federal jurisdiction over a class
of claims)26 are unwise, if not unconstitutional. 27 Second, there
appears to be a consensus that two types of jurisdiction-stripping mea-
sures are of particular concern: efforts to restrict the Supreme Court's
appellate review power and federal jurisdiction over constitutional
claims.28
satisfied all of the baselines in the scholarship. See infra note 84 and accompanying
text.
26 Such jurisdictional restrictions (affecting a class of claims) are likewise the
focus of other scholarly literature on jurisdiction stripping. My definition does not,
therefore, encompass other types of statutory limitations on federal jurisdiction, such
as amount-in-controversy requirements.
27 This widespread agreement is particularly notable in the scholarship asserting
that Congress has "plenary" power over federal jurisdiction (i.e., that Congress's
power is not subject to any judicially-enforceable Article III limits). See, e.g., Martin H.
Redish, Same-Sex Marriage, the Constitution, and Congressional Power to Control Federal
jurisdiction: Be Careful What You Wish For, 9 LEWIs & CLARK L. REv. 363, 369 (2005)
("That Congress possesses such broad constitutional power in no way implies that it
would be either wise or appropriate for Congress to exercise its authority .. .. Con-
gress should begin with a very strong presumption against seeking to manipulate judi-
cial decisions indirectly by selectively restricting federal judicial authority."); Herbert
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1006 (1965) (assert-
ing that, although "[t]he difficulty with legislative withdrawal ofjurisdiction is not one
of constitutional dimension," there are important "practical objections to complete
withdrawal" of federal jurisdiction over a subject matter). One exception to this gen-
eral sentiment was expressed by Charles Black, who argued that Congress's power to
strip federal jurisdiction served a beneficial purpose: it was essential to legitimating
judicial decisions. See CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING To LAW 18 (1981)
("'Jurisdiction' is the power to decide. If Congress has wide and deep-going power over
the courts' jurisdiction, then the courts' power to decide is a continuing and visible con-
cession from a democratically formed Congress.").
28 That is true of scholars who propose judicially-enforceable limits on congres-
sional power over federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson,
The Unitary Executive, jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist
Response tojustice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1005 (2007) (arguing that Congress
must give the Supreme Court "the final judicial word" on federal questions); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REv. 1043, 1086 (2010) (con-
tending that "a statute withdrawing both Supreme Court and lower federal courtjuris-
diction" over constitutional claims "would violate the Constitution"); James E.
Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality ofJurisdiction-
Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 191, 213 (2007) (asserting that lower courts
must be subject to Supreme Court "oversight and control"); Lawrence Gene Sager,
The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority
to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 66 (1981) (contend-
ing that Congress must provide federal court review of constitutional claims). It is
also true of scholars who believe that Congress has "plenary power" over federal juris-
diction. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the jurisdiction of the Federal
165.2 [VOL. 87:4
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Scholars have long debated the extent to which the judiciary can
enforce these two normative standards.29 But I argue that there is an
alternative enforcement mechanism: the structural and political con-
straints built into our constitutional scheme. The Madisonian system
of separated powers has served to block most efforts to strip federal
jurisdiction and has precluded virtually all measures targeted at the
Supreme Court or at constitutional claims. This structural design has
accordingly "worked" reasonably well-as judged by the normative
standards underlying the scholarship on jurisdiction stripping.
Although the scheme may not have functioned precisely as Madison
anticipated, it has nevertheless served as an "invisible hand" safeguard-
ing the federal judiciary.
A. Article I Protections
The first barrier to jurisdiction-stripping legislation is the lawmak-
ing process of Article I, which requires all federal legislation to pass
through two chambers of Congress and be presented to the Presi-
dent.3 0  These lawmaking procedures effectively create a
supermajority requirement for every piece of federal legislation and
Courts, 27 VILL. L. REv. 1030, 1039 (1981-82) (arguing that, although Congress could
strip the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over any class of cases, such a law
would violate "the spirit of the Constitution," because of the need for "a federal
Supreme Court . .. to pronounce uniform and authoritative rules of federal law");
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 921 (1984) (arguing that a law elimi-
nating jurisdiction over a class of constitutional claims would be "unwise and [would]
violate the 'spirit' of the Constitution").
29 Some scholars argue that the federal judiciary can invalidate jurisdiction-strip-
ping measures that violate (at least some) of the above normative standards. See, e.g.,
Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 206 (1985) (urging that Congress must give some
federal court jurisdiction over all cases arising under federal law); supra note 28 (col-
lecting sources that focus on the Supreme Court or constitutional claims). But many
others respond that Congress's power over federal jurisdiction is "plenary" and,
accordingly, not limited by the provisions of Article III. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish,
Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
1633, 1637 (1990) (arguing that "Congress possesses broad power to curb the jurisdic-
tion of both the lower courts and the Supreme Court"); Wechsler, supra note 27, at
1005 (same). Most scholars do, however, agree that courts could invalidate jurisdic-
tional measures that violate constitutional provisions other than Article III. See Gun-
ther, supra note 28, at 916-22 (discussing some of the debates over such "external"
constraints and noting that all scholars seem to agree that "the Bill of Rights applies
to all areas of congressional action" and that "Congress could not limit access to the
federal courts on the basis of race").
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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thereby give political factions-even political minorities-considera-
ble power to "veto" legislation.31
Recent social science research suggests that political actors have a
strong incentive to use this structural veto to block jurisdiction-strip-
ping proposals. Political scientists assert that, in our politically divided
society, the overall content of federal court decisions is generally
favored by at least one major political faction.32 Such political sup-
porters of the judiciary have good reason both to empower the federal
judiciary and to block court-curbing proposals.33
Notably, this political support is tied to the constitutional struc-
ture. The appointment and confirmation process established by the
Constitution (requiring both presidential and senatorial approval)
effectively guarantees that each federal judge has been selected by a
dominant political group.34 Thus, our process helps ensure that, at
least at the outset, a judge's views on constitutional and other legal
issues align to some degree with those of political leaders. As social
scientists concede, the fact that judges are chosen by a dominant polit-
ical faction does not mean that federal courts always issue decisions
that accord with the views of that faction.35 But this political group
does tend to favor the overall content of federal court decisions. The
selection process of Article II thus gives a major political faction an
31 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
233-36 (1962); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
TEx. L. REV. 1321, 1339 (2001); John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1314 (2010).
32 See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
33 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OFJUDICIAL SUPREMACY 18
(2007) ("Political actors defer to . . . courts because the judiciary can be useful to
their own political and constitutional goals."); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 SToD. AM. POL. DEv. 35, 43 (1993)
("[P]oliticians may facilitate judicial policymaking in part because they have good
reason to believe that the courts will announce those policies they ... favor.. . .");
Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization:
Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 91, 116 (2000)
(arguing that political leaders will empower the judiciary only if they have "a sufficient
level of certainty .. . that the judiciary in general and the supreme court in particular
are likely to produce decisions that . . . reflect their ideological preferences").
34 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
35 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 33, at 288 (noting that Supreme Court deci-
sions cannot "be reduced to the political interests of the party in power"); Howard
Gillman, Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial
Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 138, 154
(Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006) (stating that when "an institution [like the
Supreme Court] ... has extremely broad policy-making jurisdiction, ... the appoin-
tees' ideological disposition will inevitably manifest itself in ways that were not consid-
ered by the appointing parties").
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incentive to support the relatively "friendly" judiciary that it put in
place.
For example, in the late nineteenth century, the Republican
Party was dominated by pro-business conservatives who sought to
advance their economic agenda through the federal judiciary.36 The
party controlled the Presidency and the Senate during much of this
period and used this authority to appoint judges who were likely to be
sympathetic to the concerns of large corporations.3 7  Indeed, the
members of the Supreme Court were selected almost entirely based
on "their devotion to party principles and 'soundness' on the major
economic questions of the day."38 Furthermore, when the Republi-
cans had sufficient political power in Congress, they sought to expand
the size of the federal judiciary and the scope of federal jurisdiction.3 9
In the mid-to-late twentieth century, social progressives attempted
to use the judiciary to advance progressive goals, such as racial civil
rights. 4 0 Thus, progressives in Congress voted to expand the judiciary
when they anticipated that a like-minded President and Senate would
have the power to nominate and confirm judges.41 Progressive Presi-
dents then filled these new slots with judges who were likely to issue
decisions that accorded with progressive values.42 For example, in dis-
cussing one judicial candidate, President Lyndon Johnson instructed
his aide to "[c] heck to be sure [the potential nominee] is all right on
the Civil Rights question. I'll approve him if he is."43
36 See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 511,
512-13, 516-17 (2002).
37 See RIcHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRI-
ALIZATION, 1877-1900, at 7 (2000); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 159-60
(2009).
38 BENSEL, supra note 37, at 7.
39 See Gillman, supra note 36, at 516-21.
40 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 33, at 119-20, 271.
41 See Gillman, supra note 36, at 146 (describing how, in the months preceding
the 1960 presidential election, an all-Democratic Congress increased the size of the
federal judiciary only when the Democrats believed-as it turned out correctly-that
John F. Kennedy would be elected and would have the power to fill the vacancies).
42 See id. at 146-55, 158 (asserting that the "modern judicial liberalism" of the
Warren and Burger Courts "can be traced to the self-conscious efforts of Democratic
Party officeholders in the 1960s," because the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
sought to appoint judges who would favor civil rights and other progressive causes);
see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 33, at 126-34 (describing the efforts of the
Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy Administrations to obtain favorable rulings on
racial civil rights and reapportionment).
43 SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 170 (1997); see also DAVID ALIS-
TAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES 91 (1999) (noting that, according to one advisor,
20121 1655
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Political factions have thus repeatedly sought to empower the
judiciary to advance political goals during periods when their own side
was in control. 4 4 This dynamic has an important impact on that fac-
tion's political incentives once it is no longer in power. These sup-
porters of the judiciary have a strong incentive to use their Article I
veto to block jurisdiction-stripping legislation that could undermine
the authority of this "friendly" judiciary.
Indeed, there is considerable historical evidence that political
supporters of the judiciary have used their veto power to protect the
federal courts. In the late nineteenth century, populists and progres-
sives in the Democratic Party sought to curtail the power of the pro-
business judiciary by restricting federal jurisdiction over suits involving
corporations. 45 They argued that "[t]here can be no higher duty
imposed on this Congress than to lessen [the] power [of corpora-
tions] to oppress the citizen in the courts of the United States." 4 6 But
pro-business conservatives, who at that time dominated the Republi-
can Party, defended the judiciary, insisting that the "best guarantee of
security to investments [is] found in recourse to the national
courts." 47
The progressives repeatedly pushed their jurisdiction-stripping
measures through the House of Representatives, which was controlled
by the Democratic Party during much of this period.48 But each time,
the pro-business Republicans used their structural veto in the Senate
to defeat those efforts.49 Thus, as one progressive complained, "the
PresidentJohnson "viewed the [Supreme] Court as a means both of perpetuating his
social reforms and of upholding various legislative compromises he had reached on
controversial issues ranging from aid for parochial schools to consumer, health, and
environmental legislation").
44 Indeed, political scientists have found that politicians tend to expand the judi-
ciary only when they expect the President to nominate and the Senate to confirm
judges to their liking. SeeJohn M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional
Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal judici-
ary, 39 J.L. & ECON. 435, 438, 460 (1996) (contending that such expansions tend to
"occur only when the nominating president and the confirming Senate are of the
same political party as the enacting House and Senate").
45 See EDwARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALry 15 (1992).
46 14 CONG. REc. 1246 (1883) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.).
47 10 CONG. REc. 820 (1880) (statement of Rep. Hiram Barber, Jr., R-Ill.).
48 See 5 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, MILLENNIAL EDITION
ONLINE 5-201, tbl. Eb296-308 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006), available at hsus.cam-
bridge.org.
49 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 7, at 890-96.
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fate of [this jurisdiction-stripping] measure in the Senate . .. warns us
that it can never become the law."50
In the early twentieth century, the Progressive movement gained
strength in both political parties, and the Republican Party was soon
divided between the pro-business faction and a more progressive
wing.5 1 Accordingly, the relevant "factions" crossed party lines. Dur-
ing this period, progressives (now from both parties) continued to
propose jurisdiction-stripping measures and to push those measures
through the House of Representatives.5 2 But the pro-business mem-
bers of the Republican Party-even when they were only a political
minority in Congress-still had sufficient "veto power" in the Senate
to block these jurisdiction-stripping attempts. 53
Beginning in the mid-to-late twentieth century, the primary target
was the progressive civil rights jurisprudence of the Warren and Bur-
ger Courts. During this era, the political parties were coalition parties
and, accordingly, the relevant "factions" crossed party lines. The
Democrats were sharply split between a progressive wing and a more
conservative faction based largely in the South. 54 The Republican
Party was also divided (albeit to a lesser degree) between social con-
servatives and social progressives.5 5
These political factions engaged in a bitter partisan battle over
the federal judiciary. Social conservatives fought hard to strip federal
jurisdiction over constitutional claims ranging from school prayer,
reapportionment, and abortion to the use of busing to desegregate
50 21 CONG. REc. 3406 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.); see
also 26 CONG. REc. 8594 (1894) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.) (lament-
ing that, although this jurisdiction-stripping bill had passed the House in multiple
Congresses, that body had never "been able to get the concurrence of the Senate in
this measure").
51 See William N. Chambers, Party Development and the American Mainstream, in THE
AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 3, 14 (William Nisbet Chambers & Walter Dean Burnham
eds., 1967); WHITTINCTON, supra note 33, at 261.
52 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 7, at 897-98.
53 See CLYDE P. WEED, THE NEMESIS OF REFORM 11, 14 (1994) (observing that, "at
the height of the Progressive era (1908-1916), . . . the prestige of the [conservative]
old guard [of the Republican Party] was at an all-time low" and that the conservatives
had "diminished influence" during that period); Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra
note 7, at 898-99 (describing how, in 1911, conservative Republicans in the Senate
managed to filibuster a jurisdiction-stripping measure-despite their status as a
minority faction).
54 See MoRRIS P. FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 165 (2002).
55 See Mark D. Brewer, The Rise ofPartisanship and the Expansion ofPartisan Conflict
Within the American Electorate, 58 POL. RES. Q. 219, 220 (2005).
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public schools. 56 The conservatives denounced the Supreme Court
decisions in these areas as a "thorough distortion of the work of the
authors of the Constitution" and a 'judicial usurpation[ ] of power."5 7
But social progressives steadfastly defended the federal courts, warn-
ing that "[t]his type of restriction on the judicial power" would
"weaken, if not cripple, the independence of the Federal judiciary and
subvert the U.S. Constitution."5 8
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, social conservatives (from both
parties) managed to push the school prayer and busing measures
through the Senate. But social progressives used their structural veto
in the House of Representatives to preserve federal jurisdiction over
these constitutional claims.59
By the early twenty-first century, the parties had realigned. Most
social conservatives had joined the Republican Party, while virtually all
social progressives were Democrats.60 Thus, the relevant "factions"
tracked party lines-much as they had during the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Furthermore, during this period, the Republican Party con-
trolled the House, Senate, and Presidency.61 Social conservatives
56 See EDWARD KEYNES, THE COURT VS. CONGREss 195-203, 221-25, 292-98 (1989)
(discussing the efforts to curtail federal jurisdiction over abortion, busing, and school
prayer); Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the
Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REv. 988, 990-94 (1982) (similarly
noting various jurisdiction-stripping attempts from the late 1950s until the early
1980s).
57 E.g., 125 CONG. REc. 7578-79 (1979) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.)
(condemning the Court's school prayer rulings and stating that "[o]nly by a thorough
distortion of the work of the authors of the Constitution is it even remotely possible to
arrive at the sweeping condemnation of America's spiritual heritage presented in the
Court's opinions" and further stating that the Framers enacted the Exceptions Clause
"[iln anticipation of [such] judicial usurpations of power").
58 E.g., id. at 7644 (statement of Sen. John Durkin, D-N.H.) ("This type of restric-
tion on the judicial power, once applied in this instance, will become ever easier to
apply in the future... . The result will be to weaken, if not cripple, the independence
of the Federal judiciary and subvert the U.S. Constitution.").
59 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 7, at 900-16.
60 See Brewer, supra note 55, at 219-20 ("By the end of the 1980s, partisanship in
Congress had risen dramatically and has remained at a high level ever since.... At
the same time the parties were becoming more internally cohesive in their voting
behavior, they were also becoming more ideologically polarized from each other ...
(with the Democrats becoming more liberal and the GOP becoming more conserva-
tive) . . . ." (internal citation omitted)).
61 Following the 2000 elections, the Senate was evenly divided, but the Republi-
cans controlled that body because Vice President Dick Cheney could break a tie. See
Gary C. Jacobson, A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and the Congressional
Elections of 2000, 116 POL. Sci. Q. 5, 5 (2001). The Republicans' control over the
Senate was short-lived because, in May 2001, Senator Jim Jeffords left the Republican
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attempted to use this political power to eliminate federal jurisdiction
over challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act and to the use of
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance.62 These measures passed
the House of Representatives in 2004 and 2006 by wide margins, with
the support of socially conservative Republicans.63 But social progres-
sives in the Democratic Party-even though they were now only a
political minority in Congress-had sufficient political power in the
Senate to block those jurisdiction-stripping efforts.64
B. Article II Protections for the Supreme Court and Constitutional Claims
The Article I lawmaking process has thus proven to be an impor-
tant safeguard for the federal judiciary. Political factions have repeat-
edly used their structural veto to block jurisdiction-stripping efforts.
But there is an additional structural safeguard: the executive branch.
The executive has various tools at its disposal to oppose constitution-
ally questionable legislation. The President can veto or threaten to
veto problematic legislation.65 The executive can also use its role in
enforcing federal laws to ensure that laws are applied in a manner that
accords with constitutional values. 66
Social science research suggests that the executive branch has a
strong incentive to use this constitutional authority to oppose efforts
to curb federal jurisdiction. First, scholars have argued that the Presi-
dent often advances his constitutional philosophy through litigation
in the federal courts.67 Accordingly, the President has some incentive
Party and became an Independent. But the party later regained control. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009 245 (2008) (show-
ing that, after the 2002 elections, the Republicans had a 5148 majority in the Senate
and that, after 2004, the party had a majority of 5544).
62 See Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1337,
1356-57 (2006).
63 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 7, at 912-15, 938-39.
64 See id. at 915-16.
65 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; CHARLES M. CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PRESI-
DENTS AND THE PouTIcs OF NEGATIVE POWER 3 (2000) (examining "how presidents
use vetoes and veto threats to wrest policy concessions from Congress").
66 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed. . . ."); Dawn E.Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitution-
ally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 9 (Winter 2000) ("Presidents
often avoid constitutional problems, as they should, through their interpretation of
ambiguous statutes or through the exercise of enforcement discretion.").
67 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 33, at 274 (arguing that Presidents often
"[t]um [ ] to the judiciary . .. [to] advanc[e] constitutional goals"); Gillman, supra
note 35, at 146-55 (discussing the efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson Administra-
tions to appoint judges who would favor civil rights and other progressive causes).
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to defend the scope of federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
The President should have a particularly overriding interest in pro-
tecting the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, because its "deci-
sions . . . establish the legal and ideological framework within which
[the lower courts] . . . operat[e] ."68
These presidential incentives are reinforced by the institutional
incentives of the Department ofJustice. 69 The Solicitor General is in
charge of virtually all federal litigation in the Supreme Court.70 Thus,
as former Solicitor General Drew Days put it, "[o]nce cases reach the
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General plays an important role in the
development of American law" and can have a substantial "impact
upon the establishment of constitutional and other principles."7 1
This institutional position gives the DOJ a strong interest in protecting
the Supreme Court's appellate review power. By defending the
authority of the Supreme Court, the DOJ can maximize its own power
and influence over the development of federal law.72
68 Gillman, supra note 36, at 518.
69 For the DOJ's institutional incentives, I draw on social science theories of path
dependence and institutional entrenchment. Social scientists have argued that insti-
tutions, like the judiciary, may become "entrenched" (or "locked-in"), in part because
they serve as sources of power and influence for other groups in society. See PAUL
PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME 159 (2004) ("[T]here are a number of mechanisms that
appear to make expansions of court power virtually irreversible. The emergence of
courts as the site of political and legal dispute resolution generates a rapid expansion
of law-centered actors who have a considerable stake in preserving and expanding the
use of these procedures .... " (footnote omitted)). This theory helps explain why the
DOJ has an incentive to defend the federal judiciary. The DOJ's main job is to litigate
cases in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) ("Except as otherwise author-
ized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States . .. is interested . . . is
reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney
General."). The DOJ's power and influence within the executive branch is therefore
greatest when decisions are hammered out in litigation. Moreover, as discussed
below, this theory suggests that the DOJ has especially good reason to defend the
Supreme Court, because the Solicitor General is essentially the government's exclu-
sive representative at that level. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
70 See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) ("[T]he Attorney General and the Solicitor General
shall conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court. . . ."); FEC v. NRA
Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 93 (1994). Notably, before the Solicitor General
was created in 1870, see Act ofJune 22, 1870, ch. 150 §§ 1-2, 16 Stat. 162, the Attorney
General was the government's exclusive representative in the Supreme Court. See
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93.
71 Drew S. Days, III, Executive Branch Advocate v. Officer of the Court: The Solicitor
General's Ethical Dilemma, 22 NOVA L. REV. 679, 680 (1998).
72 Thus, in this context, the incentives of the "agents" in the executive branch
fortify the protections for the judiciary. Cf Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1428-29
(expressing doubt that the Madisonian scheme of separated powers could work on
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This social science research suggests that the executive branch
has a strong incentive to block the two types of jurisdiction-stripping
measures that most concern scholars: efforts to strip the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction over constitu-
tional claims. And there is considerable historical support for this.
Attorneys General of both parties have repeatedly opposed legislation
targeted at the Supreme Court or at constitutional claims, stating that
"[m]atters of constitutional interpretation and adjudication are . . .
pre-eminently within the province of the Federal judiciary,"7 3 and that
"][flull and unimpaired appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court is
fundamental under our system of government."74
Notably, the executive branch has opposed such jurisdiction-strip-
ping proposals, even when the President was otherwise deeply critical
of the federal courts' constitutional jurisprudence, and even when the
jurisdiction-stripping measures were championed by members of the
President's own political faction. For example, although more
famously associated with the Court-packing episode (discussed further
below) '7 the Roosevelt Administration strongly opposed efforts to
strip the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. In the 1930s, after
the Court struck down key New Deal legislation, certain Democratic
legislators wanted to eliminate the Court's appellate jurisdiction over
constitutional claims.7 6 But the Roosevelt Administration rejected
those proposals, with one administration official stating that the
Supreme Court's "power to declare legislation unconstitutional" was a
core 'judicial power . . . immun[e] from legislative control."7 7
the ground that "institutions are themselves aggregates of individual officials with
competing agendas, and with a great deal of agency slack between their own interests
and that of the institution").
73 125 CONG. REc. 7637 (1979) (quoting a letter from Attorney General Griffin
Bell, Carter Administration).
74 104 CONG. REc. 4423 (1958) (quoting a letter from Attorney General William
Rogers, Eisenhower Administration).
75 See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
76 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 102-03 (1995).
77 Memorandum from Warner W. Gardner, Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C., to the Solicitor General 10, 13 (Aug. 15, 1935) (copy on file with author); see
Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 7, at 270-73. Gardner was a key player in the
discussions over what to do about the "problem" created by the Supreme Court's
invalidation of New Deal measures. President Roosevelt's first Attorney General,
Homer Cummings, asked Gardner to evaluate the various court-curbing proposals
that were under consideration at the time. Gardner strongly advised against jurisdic-
tion stripping but stated that the proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court was an
"undoubtedly constitutional method by which to obtain a more sympathetic majority
of the Court." Memorandum from Warner W. Gardner, Department ofJustice, Wash-
ington, D.C., to the Solicitor General 64-65 (Dec. 10, 1936) (copy on file with
16612012]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Likewise, the Reagan Administration opposed the efforts of social
conservatives to strip federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims
like school prayer and abortion.78 The Administration took this posi-
tion, even though President Reagan described the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in those areas as "not in keeping with the Constitution
at all."79 The Administration was especially concerned about the
attack on the Supreme Court. President Reagan's first Attorney Gen-
eral William French Smith issued an Office of Legal Counsel opinion
concluding that Congress lacks the power to eliminate Supreme Court
review of constitutional claims.80 "The integrity of our system of fed-
eral law depends upon a single court of last resort having a final say on
the resolution of federal questions."81
III. IMPLICATIONS
As the above historical survey illustrates, the structural constraints
of Article I and Article II have repeatedly protected the federal judici-
ary against jurisdiction-stripping efforts.82 Indeed, the scheme of sep-
arated powers has largely met the concerns raised by academics in the
literature on jurisdiction stripping. The Article I lawmaking process
author). Cummings later asked Gardner to draft the bill that ultimately became
Roosevelt's famous Court-packing plan. See JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER 253, 256
(2010). I discuss the Court-packing proposal in more detail below. See infra notes
99-101 and accompanying text.
78 See Constitutionality of Legislation Withdrawing Supreme CourtJurisdiction to
Consider Cases Relating to Voluntary Prayer, 6 Op. O.L.C. 13, 14 (1982) [hereinafter
Constitutionality of Legislation]; Nomination ofEdwin Meese III: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 185-86 (1984) [hereinafter Nomination of Edwin
Meese III] (arguing that Congress lacks the power to "diminish or take away the core
functions of the Supreme Court," including the power to rule on constitutional
claims, and expressing the view that, as a general rule, Congress should not "limit
lower Federal court jurisdiction over a Federal constitutional question").
79 Interview with Eleanor Clift, Jack Nelson, andJoel Havemann of the Los Ange-
les Times, I PUB. PAPERS 830 (June 23, 1986) (President Reagan asserting that "the
decision that prevented voluntary prayer by anyone who wanted to do so in a school
or a public building is just not in keeping with the Constitution at all"); see Statement
on the United States Supreme Court Decision on Abortion, 1 PUB. PAPERS 876 (June
16, 1983) ("express[ing] profound disappointment" with the Court's abortion
decisions).
80 Constitutionality of Legislation, supra note 78, at 14.
81 Constitutionality of Legislation, supra note 78, at 26; see also Nomination of
Edwin Meese III, supra note 78, 185-86 (1984) (stating that, if he believed that a bill
infringed on "a core function of the Supreme Court," such as the power to rule on
constitutional claims, then he "would recommend a veto").
82 For purposes of this Essay, I provide only a summary of the historical evidence.
My earlier work offers a more detailed historical account. See supra note 7.
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has blocked most efforts to strip federal jurisdiction, and the executive
branch has used the structural tools of Article II to provide added
protection for the Supreme Court and constitutional claims. 3
Notably, I do not mean to suggest that these structural safeguards
are an absolute bulwark against jurisdiction-stripping attempts. Con-
gress has managed to enact some jurisdiction-stripping measures
(albeit generally outside the context of the Supreme Court and consti-
tutional claims), 84 and there is an important question whether the
83 Moreover, political actors in both the legislature and the executive branch may
have particularly strong reasons to protect the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Social scientists have argued that political actors establish (and later abide by) legal
constraints, including constitutional rules and judicial decisions, because they help to
settle disputed issues and thereby provide focal points around which political actors
and citizens can coordinate their actions. See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE
OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 108 (2009) (asserting that "[i]f the constitution is vague
on a certain point ... [c]onstitutional review provides focal points for enforcement");
Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 245, 246 (1997) (arguing that certain legal institutions "create a focal
solution that resolves the coordination dilemmas confronting elites and citizens").
The Supreme Court performs this settlement function for legal issues that are
referred to ourjudiciary. Even controversial Court decisions establish (at least tempo-
rarily) the boundaries of permissible governmental and private conduct and thereby
facilitate coordination. This social science research thus suggests that Congress
should be inclined to enact jurisdictional legislation that promotes the Supreme
Court's settlement function. Although this "coordination theory" is beyond the scope
of this Essay, I explore it in separate work. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause
as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Excep-
tions Clause] (copy on file with author).
84 See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (restricting the inferior
federal courts' authority to issue injunctions in labor disputes); Emergency Price Con-
trol Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 420, 56 Stat. 23 (allowing only the Supreme Court, and
not any lower federal or state court, to review certain administrative orders); see also
H.R. REP. No. 72-669, at 11-16 (1932) (making clear that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
applied only to "the inferior Federal courts"). The recent legislation involved in the
"war on terror" serves as an example. The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) and the
Military Commissions Act (MCA) were designed to eliminate federal habeas jurisdic-
tion over the claims of alleged enemy combatants in the war on terror. See DTA of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742; MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
§ 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)). But the statutes cre-
ated an alternative review scheme that left open an avenue for Supreme Court review.
The detainees' claims were routed to a military tribunal (either a combatant status
review tribunal or a military commission) followed by judicial review in the D.C. Cir-
cuit and the Supreme Court. See DTA § 1005(e) (2), 119 Stat. 2680, at 2742; MCA
§ 950g, 120 Stat. 2600, at 2622-24. (Although the DTA gives the D.C. Circuit "exclu-
sive" jurisdiction to review decisions of combatant status review tribunals, such "exclu-
sivity" provisions are generally construed so as to preserve Supreme Court review. See,
e.g., Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2006) (providing that "[t] he
court of appeals . . . has exclusive jurisdiction" to review "final orders" from certain
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judiciary should intervene when these structural provisions fail. But
my goal here is not to examine that question.85 Instead, I want to
focus on how the overall "success" of the constitutional design in this
context helps to answer some of the questions recently raised about
the Madisonian scheme of separated powers.
A. Separation of Parties and Separation of Powers
This analysis suggests that, in the context of the federal judiciary,
the "separation of parties" critique offered by Professors Levinson and
Pildes, while powerful, is incomplete. First, this theory does not
explain the executive branch's opposition to jurisdiction stripping.
The executive has fought jurisdiction-stripping measures, even during
periods of unified government, and even when the measures were
sponsored by members of the President's own party. For example, the
Roosevelt Administration rejected proposals by legislators in the Dem-
ocratic Party to eliminate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
over constitutional claims-even during a period of unified govern-
ment, when the Democrats had overwhelming majorities in both
chambers of Congress.8 6 Likewise, the Reagan Administration
federal agencies); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 750-51 (2002)
(reviewing court of appeals decision in a case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2342).) The
DTA and MCA also expressly preserved jurisdiction over certain constitutional claims.
See DTA § 1005(e) (2) (C) (ii), 119 Stat. 2680, at 2742 (permitting the D.C. Circuit to
review "to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable,
whether the use of [certain] standards and procedures [by combatant status review
tribunals] is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States"); MCA
§ 950g, 120 Stat. 2600, at 2622 (permitting the D.C. Circuit to consider whether, "to
the extent applicable," the military commission's "final decision ... was consistent
with ... the Constitution and the laws of the United States"). Congress has, however,
on rare occasions enacted statutes that appeared to eliminate Supreme Court review
over specific classes of cases (even those involving constitutional claims). But the
Court has thus far interpreted those statutes narrowly so as to preserve an avenue of
review. See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 7, at 922-27 (discussing the stat-
utes at issue in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), and Felker v. Turpin,
518 U.S. 651 (1996)).
85 Nor do I examine another issue: whether the mere proposal of jurisdiction-
stripping measures (even when they are not enacted) has an impact on judicial inde-
pendence. Cf Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing and judicial Legiti-
macy, 53 Am. J. POL. Sci. 971, 972 (2009) (arguing that "Court curbing in Congress
may affect judicial decision making independent of any threat of enactment ...
because it can be a credible signal about waning judicial legitimacy" with the public).
I plan to explore that issue in future work.
86 See HISTOlICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATEs, supra note 48, at 5-201, tbl.
Eb296-308 (showing that the Democrats controlled the House 331-89 and the Senate
76-16 in 1937-38).
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strongly opposed the jurisdiction-stripping proposals championed by
other socially conservative Republicans.
This dynamic can be largely explained by the institutional incen-
tives of the executive branch. The President plays a central role in
selecting federal judges8 7 and "[tlhrough control over the Justice
Department ... can exercise significant influence over . .. what argu-
ments are presented" to the courts.88 This institutional authority
enables the President to influence the development of federal law
through the judiciary-an authority that many leaders have used to
advance their constitutional philosophy. 9
These institutional factors help explain why both the Roosevelt
and the Reagan Administrations defended the federal judiciary
against legislative attacks.90 Both leaders sought to advance their
(very different) constitutional visions through litigation in the federal
courts.91 Thus, President Roosevelt selected judges who would be
inclined to defer to New Deal economic programs; President Reagan
preferred nominees who seemed likely to favor states' rights and to
take a conservative stance on social issues.92 Both Presidents also had
their Justice Departments argue in favor of that constitutional vision
87 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . .Judges of the supreme
Court . . . ."); Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? judicial Power, Political Frag-
mentation, and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REv. 95, 103 (2009) ("Presi-
dents . . . typically have more influence than legislators on the staffing of federal
courts.").
88 WHITTINGTON, supra note 33, at 196.
89 Of course, the President can also use the judiciary to pursue other policies. See
WHITTINGTON, supra note 33, at 197 n.124 (observing that "constitutional interpreta-
tion is not the only form of policymaking that presidents might pursue through the
courts"). But, in part because of our longstanding tradition of judicial supremacy, it
is easier for the President to advance his constitutional philosophy in this context.
The President can use the administrative state to advance other policies. See Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2248 (2001) (noting that
agencies can "showcase and advance presidential policies").
90 I discuss below how Roosevelt's Court-packing plan fits into this analysis. See
infra 99-101.
91 See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICs PRESIDENTS MAKE 36-37, 288, 414-15
(1997) (describing Roosevelt and Reagan as "reconstructive" leaders who sought to
change the constitutional and political landscape); WHITTINGTON, supra note 33, at 23
("The list of [reconstructive] presidents . .. includes Thomas Jefferson, AndrewJack-
son, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and less strongly Ronald Reagan.").
92 See GOLDMAN, supra note 43, at 285 (arguing that both Roosevelt and Reagan
'self-consciously attempted to use the power ofjudicial appointment to place on the
bench judges who shared their general philosophy").
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in federal court.9 3 These elected leaders thus had a strong incentive
to preserve federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims, so that a
more "friendly" judiciary could "fix" what the leaders saw as the consti-
tutional errors of the past.
Congress, by contrast, has few ways to directly affect the course of
judicial decisions.94 Congress may, of course, seek to influence the
courts by changing the size of the judiciary, declining to increase judi-
cial pay, or even modifying the scope of federal jurisdiction. But Con-
gress rarely speaks directly to the courts in litigation and, thus, has far
less influence over the development of federal law.95 Indeed, even if
legislators wanted to become more involved in litigation,96 it is not
clear that a multi-member body like Congress could consistently craft
a coherent constitutional vision to advance in court.97 The executive
93 See Neal Devins, Government Lauyers and the New Dea4 96 COLUM. L. REv. 237,
256-61 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN
(1995) (arguing that the Justice Department's efforts to defend New Deal legislation
were a critical part of Roosevelt's constitutional reform efforts); Grove, Article II Safe-
guards, supra note 7, at 281-82 (explaining how both Reagan's first Attorney General
William French Smith and his second Attorney General Ed Meese urged the federal
courts to take a more conservative stance on social issues like school prayer, busing,
and abortion).
94 That is true, even when we take into account the Senate's role in judicial con-
firmation. See Graber, supra note 87, at 103 ("Presidents . . . typically have more
influence than legislators on the staffing of federal courts.").
95 For an insightful analysis of why Congress acquiesces in presidential control of
litigation, see Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the
White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 205 (1998).
96 Some scholars have suggested that Congress should take a more assertive role
in litigation. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REv. 914, 948
(2012) (arguing that "Congress needs to become an advocate for its interests in
court").
97 The recent litigation over the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No.
104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), serves as an example. The Bipartisan House Legal
Advisory Group (BLAG), which consists of five individuals (the Speaker, the majority
and minority leaders, and the majority and minority whips), voted 3-2 along party
lines to defend the constitutionality of DOMA. See Chris Geidner, House Republicans
Vote to Defend DOMA in Court on Party Line 3-2 Vote, METRO WEEKLY (March 9, 2011,
6:14PM), http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/03/house-republicans-vote-to-
defe.html. But the BLAG's position does not necessarily represent the consensus view
of the House. A group of 133 House members filed a brief supporting the DOMA
challengers. See Kathleen Hennessey, Democrats File Amicus Brief Challenging Defense of
Marriage Act, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011 (observing that "House Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi, Democratic Whip Steny Hoyer and 131 other members signed the brief, which
argues that [DOMA] is unconstitutional because it was passed quickly, driven by
biases, and lacks 'a rational relationship to any legitimate federal purpose'"). Moreo-
ver, the Senate does not appear to have taken any position in the litigation. Accord-
ingly, it is hard to say that "Congress" has adopted an official position on DOMA. By
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branch, by contrast, with a single leader at the helm, has both the
institutional tools and a far greater capacity to use litigation to
advance the President's constitutional philosophy. 8
Notably, these differing institutional incentives may also help
explain the branches' different approaches to Roosevelt's Court-pack-
ing plan. Although the Court-packing plan may, at first glance, seem
inconsistent with the Roosevelt Administration's rejection of jurisdic-
tion-stripping legislation, the Administration's approach makes some
sense when viewed in terms of the executive branch's institutional
incentives. Presidents have an incentive to preserve federal jurisdic-
tion, because they can use the courts to advance their constitutional
philosophy. Those same incentives lead Presidents to appoint judges
who are sympathetic to that philosophy. In other words, Presidents
who seek to promote their constitutional views through the judiciary
have a strong incentive to "pack" the federal courts.99 Congress, by
contrast, lacks the institutional tools that enable the President to influ-
ence the development of federal law. That may help explain why an
all-Democratic Congress balked at Roosevelt's Court-packing proposal
(and why many legislators instead favored jurisdiction stripping).
Given the executive branch's influence with the judiciary in normal
times, legislators found "abhorrent" the "idea of giving [the] presi-
dent . .. the [additional] authority to remake the Supreme Court vir-
tually overnight."100
Accordingly, the political branches have competing institutional
incentives that lead them to approach jurisdiction-stripping (and, it
contrast, the Obama Administration has clearly declared its view that DOMA is uncon-
stitutional. See Letter from Attorney General Eric H. Holder to John A. Boehner,
Speaker, House of Representatives, Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23,
2011), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/1 1-ag-223.html
[hereinafter Holder, Letter] (stating that "the President . .. has made the determina-
tion that [DOMA,] as applied to same-sex couples who are legally married under state
law, violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment" and that the
DOJ would "cease defense of [the statute]").
98 See supra note 97 (noting that, in contrast to Congress, the executive branch
has taken a clear position on the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act).
Notably, one need not accept "unitary executive theory" to agree that the executive
branch has a greater capacity than the multi-member Congress to craft a coherent
constitutional vision.
99 For that reason, "Roosevelt's proposal to pack the Court with his supporters
contained no provision requiring judicial restraint at all. . . . The administration
hoped to harness the power of the Court, not destroy it." WHiTrTNGTON, supra note
35, at 266-67 (emphasis added).
100 SHESOL, supra note 77, at 316.
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seems, other court-curbing) proposals differently.101 As Madisonian
theory might predict, the executive's institutional incentives-its
"ambition" to have greater influence over the development of federal
law-lead it to "resist" congressional encroachments on federal juris-
diction during periods of both unified and divided government. 102 In
sum, the executive branch's approach to jurisdiction stripping has
depended on the separation of powers, not parties.
By contrast, the "separation of parties" thesis does better explain
how members of Congress respond to jurisdiction-stripping measures.
While executive officials have strong institutional reasons to protect
the judiciary (regardless of partisan affiliation), legislators vote largely
along partisan lines. Of course, this "partisan" voting does not always
neatly track the two major political parties. In our history, the rele-
vant political factions have often crossed party lines.10 3 For example,
in the late twentieth century, social conservatives and social progres-
sives from both parties battled over jurisdiction-stripping legislation.
Nevertheless, as the "separation of parties" thesis would predict, these
competing factions were motivated more by political incentives than
by institutional ones-perhaps because legislators lack strong institu-
tional incentives to preserve federal jurisdiction.
But, even in the context of the legislative branch, the "separation
of parties" argument is incomplete. This theory largely overlooks the
"supermajoritarian" nature of the Article I lawmaking process and the
power that it gives political minorities to "veto" legislation. 1 0 4 This
101 Indeed, the demise of the court-curbing proposals in the 1930s (Court packing
and jurisdiction stripping) appears to be a tribute to the constitutional separation of
powers. The executive branch resisted proposals to restrict federal jurisdiction and
instead sought to "harness the power of the Court" to advance its constitutional
vision, WHITTINGTON, supra note 35, at 266-67 ("Roosevelt's proposal to pack the
Court with his supporters contained no provision requiring judicial restraint at all....
The administration hoped to harness the power of the Court, not destroy it."). Con-
gress, in turn, sought to prevent such executive "harnessing." Accordingly,
"[a]mbition [was] made to counteract ambition" in a manner that protected the con-
stitutional value in an independent judiciary. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 4.
Although a detailed examination of the Court-packing plan is beyond the scope of
this Essay, this episode does further suggest that the "separation of parties" thesis does
not explain the political branches' approaches to the federal judiciary.
102 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 4.
103 Professors Levinson and Pildes acknowledge this point. See Levinson & Pildes,
supra note 5, at 2339 (observing that "during periods of ideologically heterogeneous
parties, relatively stable cross-partisan coalitions have constituted a government major-
ity along certain policy dimensions").
104 Professors Levinson and Pildes mention certain "supermajoritarian" aspects of
the Article I lawmaking process. See id. at 2339, 2371-73 (noting that "[s]upermajority
requirements in the lawmaking process (including veto overrides and Senate filibus-
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minority "veto power" has enabled supporters of the judiciary to block
jurisdiction-stripping proposals, even during periods of unified gov-
ernment. Thus, pro-business conservatives in the early twentieth cen-
tury and social progressives in the early twenty-first century
successfully vetoed jurisdiction-stripping bills-despite their status as
political minorities.
These historical examples suggest an important limitation on the
"separation of parties" theory. These supporters of the judiciary
were-as Professors Levinson and Pildes would predict-motivated to
protect the judiciary largely because of their political interests. But
the Article I lawmaking process gave them the structural tools to act
on those political incentives.
Accordingly, in this context, it is incomplete to say that the
checks and balances of the constitutional scheme depend on the sepa-
ration of parties. The judiciary has been protected by the separation
of parties and the separation of powers.
B. Structural Incentives to Protect the Federal Judiciary
This analysis also offers a response to Professor Vermeule's
important challenge to the Madisonian design. Professor Vermeule
argues that there is no reason, in the abstract, to expect political
actors to use their institutional authority to safeguard constitutional
values.105 But, as we have seen, government officials do have an incen-
tive to use the structural tools of Article I and Article II to protect the
Article III courts.
That is largely because our constitutional structure ensures that
the judiciary is politically constructed. Under Article II and Article III
(in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause), political
actors appoint federal judges and determine the size of the judiciary
as well as the scope of federal jurisdiction.106 These structural tools
ter cloture votes) often necessitate some degree of bipartisanship even when govern-
ment is unified"). But they do not appear to acknowledge that the regular
procedures are themselves supermajoritarian.
105 See Vermeule, supra note 6, at 27-28 ("Madison's argument ... lacks any mech-
anism to ensure that competition among institutions promoting their interests or
ambitions will promote a state of affairs that is both patterned and desirable overall
. ... ); Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1427-28 ("There is no systematic reason to think
that [the Madisonian scheme] will produce efficient outcomes, somehow defined, or
other benefits such as the protection of liberty.").
106 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. III; David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic
Limits of Congress's Power Regarding theJudicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REv. 75, 80 (assert-
ing that most of "Congress' power regarding the judiciary derives [from] the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause").
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enable a major political faction to construct a judiciary that will be
sympathetic to its constitutional values-as pro-business conservatives
did in the late nineteenth century, and social progressives did in the
twentieth century. Once a political faction has empowered such a
"friendly" judiciary, that faction has a strong incentive to use its Article
I veto to protect the ongoing authority of the federal courts.
The President, of course, also has a strong incentive to protect a
"friendly" judiciary that his political faction helped to empower.107
But the Constitution gives the executive branch additional reasons to
support the judiciary-even when the President strongly disagrees
with the content of federal court decisions. The Appointments and
Take Care Clauses of Article II give the executive a leading role in
judicial appointments and a direct role in federal litigation. Accord-
ingly, when the President objects to federal court decisions, he has the
institutional tools to try to change them. This constitutional authority
over the development of federal law gives the executive a strong (and
nonpartisan) incentive to defend the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
Accordingly, in this context, there are good reasons to expect the
Madisonian scheme of separated powers to "promote a state of affairs
that is . . . desirable overall" 08-at least as judged by the normative
standards underlying the scholarship on jurisdiction stripping. The
constitutional structure itself (i.e., the authority that it gives political
actors to empower and influence the judiciary) provides the "robust
mechanism[s]" that "align" the interests of elected officials with the
public interest in an independent judiciary.109
Of course, one might wonder whether the federal judiciary can
be truly "independent" of its political supporters. But historical evi-
dence suggests that courts are not subservient to the political faction
that empowered them. For example, the Warren Court's decisions on
issues like school prayer and busing were extremely unpopular-even,
107 When the President agrees with the federal courts' jurisprudence, the execu-
tive branch has both partisan and institutional reasons to oppose jurisdiction-strip-
ping legislation. For example, the Kennedy Administration strongly favored
reapportionment and filed briefs in support of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 270. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that Attorney General
Robert Kennedy was "strongly against" congressional efforts to strip federal jurisdic-
tion over reapportionment. See Anthony Lewis, Democrats Weigh Policy on Seating and
Districting, N.Y. TIMrs, Aug. 20, 1964, at 1.
108 Vermeule, supra note 6, at 27.
109 See id. at 27.
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it seems, with many social progressives.110 Nevertheless, the social
progressives defended the Court and sought to block jurisdiction-
stripping measures (even as they acknowledged their disagreement
with individual decisions)."' Thus, it appears that federal courts do
have some leeway to venture beyond the agenda contemplated by
their political supporters and protect "unpopular" constitutional
values.
This observation suggests an important implication of the struc-
tural safeguards for the federal judiciary. By empowering and protect-
ing the federal judiciary, political actors may also-albeit perhaps
inadvertently-safeguard other (less popular) constitutional values.
This possibility depends on the extent to which the judiciary serves to
protect individual rights and other constitutional concerns, even in
the face of majoritarian opposition. Although it appears that federal
courts do have some leeway to protect unpopular constitutional val-
ues," 2 recent scholarship has cast doubt on their capacity to do so in
most cases."i 3 A resolution of that debate is beyond the scope of this
110 See Alison Gash & Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CON-
STITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 62, 68-70, 77 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (showing
that over seventy percent of the public disagreed with the Court's school prayer deci-
sions in the late 1970s and early 1980s); Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, supra, at 18, 34-35 (showing that over
eighty percent of the public disagreed with the Court's busing decisions at that time).
111 For example, during the debates over the school prayer measure, Representa-
tive Harold Sawyer stated that, although he was "in favor of allowing voluntary prayer
in the schools," "the thing that frighten[ed] [him] about the (proposal]" was that it
might encourage future efforts to "deprive the Supreme Court of any jurisdiction to
cover the due process clause, or civil rights, or equal treatment" and thereby "virtually
emasculate the Bill of Rights." Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings-Federal CourtJuris-
diction: Hearing on S. 450 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 26 (1980) (statement of Rep. Harold
Sawyer, R-Mich.); see also 128 CONG. REc. 864 (1982) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, D-
Mich.) (stating, during the debates over the busing measure, that although he
"share[d] ... the general dislike of busing children away from their neighborhood
schools," he was "deeply troubled by this [urisdiction-stripping proposal]," because it
"would remove from the Federal courts the power to enforce the Constitution").
112 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
113 A number of scholars have recently argued that federal court decisions rarely
depart from popular opinion. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 16 (arguing that
"judicial review in the modem era ... ratif[ies] the American people's considered
views about the meaning of their Constitution"); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMO-
CRATIC BRANCH 3 (2006) (arguing that, in recent years, the Supreme Court has often
"represented the views of a majority of Americans more accurately than the polarized
party leadership in Congress"). For important critiques of this "majoritarian" theory,
see Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REv. 755, 757-58 (2011)
(doubting that Supreme Court decisions "reflect[ ] the 'consensus' views of the Amer-
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Essay. For present purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that, to the
extent that the federal courts do have a role in enforcing constitu-
tional norms (as many scholars still appear to assume they do), 114 the
structural safeguards of federal jurisdiction help ensure that the
courts have an opportunity to play that role.
CONCLUSION
For many years, scholars and jurists took for granted that the
Madisonian system of separated powers would serve as a self-enforcing
"machine" that would safeguard constitutional values.' 15 Although
recent scholarship has called into question that longstanding assump-
tion, this scholarship does not necessarily undermine the Madisonian
regime. The scheme of separated powers may still work well to pre-
serve specific constitutional values-as it does for the federal judiciary.
In this context, political actors have repeatedly found it in their inter-
est to use the structural tools of Article I and Article II to safeguard
the Article III judicial power.
ican public," because the public rarely has a united position on controversial constitu-
tional issues); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010
Sup. CT. REv. 103, 116 (2010) (arguing that "today's majoritarians ... rely on con-
stantly varying and slippery conceptions of the majority that purportedly constrains
the Court" and "are not clear enough about the mechanisms or institutional pressures
by which the Court is purportedly constrained").
114 Much of our legal scholarship-including the jurisdiction-stripping literature
discussed above-seems to rest on the premise that the judiciary plays an important
role in enforcing constitutional norms, even in the face of political opposition.
Indeed, that assumption almost certainly underlies the scholarly concern about strip-
ping federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims. See supra note 28.
115 See Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARv. L. REv. 611, 670-71, 679
(1999) (discussing the widespread acceptance of Madison's theory, particularly from
the early twentieth century to the present day).
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